In this paper we discuss the role that deontic logic plays in the specification of information systems, either because constraints on the systems directly concern norms or, and even more importantly, system constraints are considered ideal but violable (so-called 'soft' constraints).
Introduction: Soft Constraints and Deontic Logic

Integrity Constraints for Information Systems
An information system is a system that stores data about a part of the real world called the Universe of Discourse (UoD). In order to specify an information system, we must specify a conceptual model of the UoD that fixes the meaning of the data in the information system. The conceptual model is in fact a set of meaning conventions for the symbols manipulated by the system. For example, a personnel information system stores data about the employees of a company. The UoD of the system is the set of employees of the company and a conceptual model of this set describes the properties of employees represented by the system. It is this conceptual model that determines the meaning of the data; an interpretation of the data that goes beyond the conceptual model may be valid but is not guarantied to be correct by the system. Traditionally, conceptual data models represented the types of entities that can exist in the UoD and the relationships that can exist between these types of entities. With the advent of richer specification languages for conceptual models, it becomes possible to specify various kinds of actual and desirable properties of entities in the UoD. For example, predicate logic can be used to specify that all employees are persons and that no employee can have a temporary and permanent employment contract with the same employer at the same time. Temporal logic can be used to specify that the age of a person can never decrease or that an employment contract will eventually be terminated. These properties of the UoD are (hard) constraints on the system, because they specify properties that the structure and behaviour of the data in the system must have. If we assume, for the sake of the argument, that it is not possible that an employee violates one of these properties, then a state or behaviour of the system that violates one of these properties is wrong. Hence, any property known to be true of the UoD is a constraint that must be satisfied by the information system. These properties are called integrity constraints for the system.
In order to be able to reason about integrity constraints, it is useful to use logic as a specification language for conceptual models. For example, order-sorted predicate logic can be used to specify taxonomic structures, temporal logic can be used to specify temporal constraints, dynamic logic to specify system transactions, etc. Once we have a logic specification of a conceptual model, we can use the inference system of the logic to derive properties of the model and we can validate the model by checking whether these properties do, as a matter of fact, hold in the UoD.
Recently, it has been recognized that it is useful to be able to specify desirable properties of the UoD, that may be violated by the UoD ( [WMW89] ). A popular example in this respect is the UoD constraint that the salary of an employee never decreases. Other examples studied in the literature include the UoD constraint that a book that is borrowed from a library should be returned within three weeks and that a bank account should have a non-negative balance. All of these properties may be violated by a UoD. This means that these properties must not be translated into constraints on the system. Rather, the system must be able to represent violations of these constraints. Representing these violations is precisely one of the functions of the system. Nevertheless, it would be useful if the system would be able to represent these desirable properties of the UoD and would be able to represent violations of these properties as violations. We call such a desirable property of the UoD that is used in the specification of a conceptual model a soft constraint, because the system must be able to represent and signal violations of these constraints. The desire to specify soft constraints motivates the use of deontic logic in the specification of conceptual models.
Deontic logic and violations of constraints
Deontic logic is a logic to reason about ideal versus actual states or behaviour. These can be expressed in the logic by means of operators for prohibition (F), permission (P) and obligation (O). In deontic logic one can express that ideally constraints are complied to, but actually violations may occur. Moreover, one has the ability to specify what should happen in case of a violation (in order to restore integrity or take some other compensating action, for instance). As such it is a very useful tool for the specification of 'soft' integrity constraints for computer systems, and information systems in particular.
For instance, consider an information system (knowledge base) for a library. Specifying such a system involves a lot of 'soft' constraints expressing ideal situations or behaviour of the agents involved, which may be represented by formulas with deontic operators. expressing the 'soft' (violable) constraint that when a person p borrows a book b, he should return it within 3 weeks. Typically, since a library does not have any control over the borrower, it is very well conceivable that the constraint is violated. In our particular logic we shall signal such a situation of violation by means of a special propositional atom; e.g. in this particular case by the atom V return (p, b) . This atom can then be employed by specifying a compensating action such as paying a fine, e.g. as follows:
expressing that when a person fails to fulfil his obligation to return the borrowed book, he has to pay a fine of $2.
Sometimes also database integrity constraints per se are regarded as deontic (e.g. [Kwa93] ):
stating that the database must satisfy (ideally satisfies) the integrity constraints IC. In effect this approach treats every IC as a 'soft' constraint, the violation of which can be represented, so that, when violated, integrity-recovering actions might be specified.
Recently deontic logic has indeed been taken up as a specification tool for a wide variety of software systems, ranging from the specification of fault-tolerant behaviour for use in advanced software to electronic contracting systems for use in organisations, as well as integrity constraints in databases and legal expert systems (cf. [MW93b], in particular [WM93] ).
The Paradoxes of Deontic Logic
(Standard) deontic logic (SDL) is not without problems, however: it has been plagued by many so-called paradoxes since its inception. These paradoxes signify more or less mismatches between the formal deontic concepts and their everyday use. More specifically, the paradoxes in deontic logic are logical expressions that are valid in a (or even most) well-known logical system(s) for deontic reasoning, but which are counterintuitive in a common-sense reading (cf.
[Åqv84], Section II). Of course, matching theorems and intuitions is a general problem of measuring a logic (or even more generally, a formal approach) against the purpose it was devised for. (This is sometimes called the validation problem.) But it is remarkable that in the realm of deontic logic these problems appear to be much more serious and persistent through the years than in, for instance, other modal logics such as temporal and epistemic logics. Some of these paradoxes appear and re-appear again in the literature for several decades now without the community of researchers seemingly arriving at a consensus. What is even more surprising is the relative simplicity of the paradoxes. Most of them can be explained to a complete layman in deontic logic in a couple of minutes. Yet they have been haunting deontic logicians for many years now. To mention some of the best known ones: -Ross's Paradox: ought-to-mail-a-letter implies ought-to-mail-a-letter-or-burn-it.
-Free Choice Paradox: allowed-to-mail-a-letter implies allowed-to-mail-a-letter-or-burn-it.
-No Conflicting Obligations: ought implies permitted -Good Samaritan Paradox: ought-to-help-Jones-who-is-robbed implies Jones-ought-to-berobbed -Chisholm's Paradox: ought-to-do-A, ought-to-do-(A-implies-B), not-A implies ought-to-donot-B and actually doing-not-A is inconsistent.
Not all paradoxes are considered equally serious. Of the small list above the contrary-to-dutyimperatives such as Chisholm's paradox are generally considered by far the most awkward and even embarrassing by deontic logicians.
When (proposing to) using deontic logic for specification of concrete systems, these should be dealt with one way or another, either by resolving the paradoxes or by explaining why they are harmless in the context of application. Our claim in this paper is that all of the deontic paradoxes in the literature are harmless, except for the ones concerning the so-called contrary-to-duty (CTD) imperatives, such as the Chisholm paradox. Moreover, CTD imperatives are omnipresent in daily life as well as in more technical circumstances. An instance of the Chisholm paradox comprises the following assertions: 2. if there is an error, there should be a warning.
3. if there is no error, there should be no warning.
there is an error.
In SDL this set of assertions cannot be represented consistently (without one of the assertions being redundant), while intuitively the set is both consistent and nonredundant. On the other hand, it is absolutely imperative to be able to specify situations of this kind.
Another important claim in this paper is that because of their conceptual difference one should distinguish between the notions of ought-to-be ('Seinsollen') and ought-to-do ('Tunsollen'), to the extent of using really different logics for these two notions. The former notion can be employed to specify what should hold ideally in the states of a system (or, put in other words, what the ideal states of the system are), while the latter notion can express the ideal behaviour of a system. So, when we try to solve the Chisholm paradox we first have to distinguish between ought-to-be and ought-to-do versions of this paradox. In order to represent the ought-to-be version of the Chisholm set properly we present a multi-modal extension S5O (n) of SDL. For solving the ought-to-do variant we employ a reduction to dynamic logic, and show how the (ought-to-do version of the) Chisholm set can be treated adequately in this setting. Although we advocate distinguishing between logics for ought-to-be and ought-to-do reasoning, on the other hand we claim that in practice one needs both forms and hence a way to deal with these in an integrated framework. In Section 7 we discuss such a way of integrating both ought-to-be and ought-to-do reasoning, enabling one to draw conclusions from ought-to-be constraints to ought-to-do ones, and show the use(fulness) of this by an example.
Standard Deontic Logic (SDL)
One of the first systems for deontic logic that really was a serious attempt to capture deontic reasoning was the now so-called "Old System" of Von Wright ([vW51] ), of which a modal (Kripke-style) version has become known as Standard Deontic Logic (SDL).
SDL consists of the following axioms and rules:
(Taut) the tautologies of propositional logic (or just enough of them)
Here ⊥ stands for falsum.
SDL has a Kripke-style modal semantics based on a set of possible worlds(, a truth assignment function of primitive propositions per possible world) and an accessibility relation associated with the O-modality (cf. e.g. [MW93a] ). This accessibility relation points to "ideal" or "perfect deontic alternatives" of the world under consideration. The crux behind this is that in some possible world something (say ϕ) is obligated, if ϕ holds in all the perfect alternatives of this world, as indicated by the accessibility relation.
So, formally these models have the following form: M = (S, π, R O ), where S is the set of states, π is a truth assignment function, and R O is the deontic accessibility relation, which are assumed to be serial, i.e. for all s ∈ S there is a t ∈ S such that R O (s, t).
The operator O is interpreted by means of the relation R O : M, s ¥ Oϕ iff M, t ¥ ϕ for all t with R O (s, t). The system SDL can be shown sound and complete with respect to validity in this class of models via a standard argument. (The system SDL coincides with the system KD in the classification of Chellas [Che80] .)
A few theorems of SDL:
The Paradoxes of Deontic Logic
The paradoxes of deontic logic are logical expressions (in some logical language) that are valid in a (or even most, as is often the case) well-known logical system for deontic reasoning, but which are counterintuitive in a common-sense reading. Of course, there is the general problem of measuring a formal approach (logic) against the purpose it was devised for: do formal theorems in the logic match the intuition? But in the realm of deontic logic this problem seems to be more serious and persistent than in other (modal) logics such as temporal and epistemic logic (although in epistemic logic there is, for instance, the problem of logical omniscience, see, Traditionally, deontic logic has been proposed and used for reasoning about ethical and legal aspects. This has resulted in a critical evaluation of the logic in its capacity of supposedly giving an adequate representation and reasoning mechanism for these applications. Originally, also the paradoxes were discovered and judged against this background. The question arises naturally whether the paradoxes are equally problematic when deontic logic is used for the specification of advanced information systems, e.g. knowledge based or intelligent systems where norms (or rather normative versus nonnormative behaviour) play a role. We will argue that the computer science (or AI) view may be different in at least two ways: − it may offer a dynamic perspective, taking notions of action and time into (more explicit) account. − it may also offer a pragmatic perspective: computer science has a definite engineering aspect and therefore computer scientists are interested in things that work (sufficiently) rather than deep philosphical issues.
With respect to the former, computer science may really give some new insight and help the traditional area of deontic logic by offering new interpretations and logics. We shall in fact our ought-to-do logic on one of these in Section 6. With respect to the latter, we admit that computer scientists will mainly help themselves, (ab?)using deontic logic the way they need, not being bothered by old and profound questions. So, on the one hand, one has deontic logicians being plagued by long-standing paradoxes without seemingly arriving at a consensus, while on the other hand, one has computer scientists wanting to apply deontic logic to their field of interest.
What should be their attitude towards deontic logic, and the paradoxes in particular? Do these present insurmountable problems for them, too? Let us first have a look at some of the most infamous paradoxes from the literature.
Some Well-Known Paradoxes
The following is a list of the most well-known paradoxes from the deontic logic literature:
1. Empty normative system Oϕ (ϕ a tautology), e.g. O(ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ) illustrated with an instance like "if one is obliged to mail a letter, one is obliged to mail the letter or burn it." This sounds paradoxical in ordinary language usage. 3. implies that if ϕ is permitted but ψ is not, nevertheless "ϕ or ψ " is permitted. This is sometimes felt as counterintuitive since "ϕ or ψ is permitted" suggests that one is free to choose either doing ϕ or doing ψ. 4. is analogous to 3. It has as an instance that if someone is forbidden to do a crime, one is also forbidden to do a crime and do penitence. 5. says that every logical consequence of something that is obligated is obligated itself. This is amenable to debate, as in an instance like "if Jones helps Smith who has been injured implies Smith has been injured, so if it is obliged that Jones helps Smith who has been injured, it is obliged that Smith has been injured". 6. is an abstract version of the set "if you are obliged to go to a party; it is obliged that, if you go, you tell you're coming; but if you do not go, you are obliged to not tell you're coming; and, in fact, you do not go to the party". This is intuitively consistent, but inconsistent in SDL (see Section 3.2). 7.'s paradoxical nature is exemplified by the macabre instance: "one is forbidden to murder; still, if one murders someone, one has to do it gently (i.e. one has to commit a gentle murder); moreover, a gentle murder implies a murder; one murders someone". This set is inconsistent again in SDL, whereas it makes perfect (common) sense. 8. states that there is no conflict of duties, which is manifestly not in line with daily-life situations. 9. are deontic versions of the paradoxes of material implication in classical logic. 10. states that obligations are closed under implication. This is controversial in the same sense as 5. with which it is strongly related.
11. states that only things (actions) that can be (done) might be obliged. This denies the possibility to specify that one is really obligated to do the impossible. 12. is puzzling as shown by the instance: "if you ought to know that your spouse is committing adultery, it ought to be that your spouse is committing adultery."
The Paradoxes in SDL
In SDL all paradoxes 1. -10. are theorems. (We leave 11. and 12. out of our discussion since they involve modalities, viz. knowledge and ontological possibility, which are not present in that is associated with deontics!) Do we have to conclude from this that this is not a good approach? Well, this depends on the situation at hand. In fact, we shall argue below that sometimes it is not, but in other situations this style of semantics is sufficient in adequacy.
Contrary-to-Duty Imperatives
One of the most serious paradoxes in ( Intuitively, this set of statements is perfectly understandable and consistent, and none of the four statements seems to be redundant in the set. However, if we try to represent this set in SDL, we run into serious trouble. A more or less natural way to represent the Chisholm set in SDL is the following:
In SDL this set (i') -(iv') is inconsistent, contrary to the intuitions about (i) -(iv):
In SDL we have as a theorem O(p → q) → (Op → Oq), which together with (ii') yields Oq. On the other hand, (iii') and (iv') give O¬q. And in SDL Oq ∧ O¬q is inconsistent.
Note furthermore that it is not really coincidental that (ii) and (iii) are represented in a different way (which may be questionable, of course). If we would, for instance, replace (iii') by
we have that (iii") is derivable from (i') in SDL, which does no justice to the intuition that all of (i) -(iv) are independent from each other. Similarly, if we would replace (ii') by (ii") p → Oq, this statement (ii") would be derivable from (iv'), contrary to the intuitions concerning independence.
A Diagnosis of the Problems
At least part of the problems arise from the following four confusions:
(i) confusion between ought-to-be and ought-to-do.
Since the inception of deontic logic there has been some confusion about the meaning of Oϕ, or rather of the meaning of ϕ is this context: is it a description of a state-of-affairs or does it denote an act(ion)? We will argue that if one views ϕ as an action description (i.e., one is interested in so-called ought-to-do's) viewing the O-modality as a modal operator in SDL-style is not adequate, while for ought-to-be's where ϕ denoted a state-of-affairs this might be adequate for concrete applications. Here we may adhere to some form of pragmatics: we simply look at what works in a given simple context without having any pretensions or claims about a logic of norms, ethics or morality in general.
In any case what is very important to notice is that in our view this results in having distinct (and really different) logics for ought-to-be and ought-to-do.
(ii) confusion between the formal interpretation (of the logical operators ∧, ∨ and →, for example) and the natural language (commonsense) reading of these.
Here we have again a form of pragmatics: once we realise that the formal interpretation of the operators used do not match the commonsense one, we just use them in their formal interpretation without trying to solve the mismatch. The only thing one should be aware of if one follows this line of action, is that one should be very careful when translating informal (natural language-style) specifications into formal ones or vice versa.
(iii) confusion between ideality and actuality; and, in particular, an overestimation of ideality and the notion of perfect alternative as it appears in the formal semantics. In particular, norms can conflict in reality! [vdT94] ). Clearly, this topic has now been taken up very seriously by researchers in the AI & Law Community, and it is to be expected that a lot of this line of research will dominate deontic logic and reasoning about norms for the years to come.
(iv) confusion between normative notions necessary in general abstract contexts (such as ethics) and those needed (and sufficient) for a concrete practical application.
When one is interested in the specification of concrete systems one can imagine to be interested in different problems than one is analyzing deep philosophical problems. This appears also to be the case when one is dealing with normative issues. Specifying normative systems, systems in which norms play an important role, requires a more pragmatic view on matters pertaining to reasoning about norms. It has now been recognized by several authors that deontic logic may be useful for normative system specification, but which deontic logic is best suited for this purpose? It appears to be the case that the most important role of the logic to be used is to accommodate for the need to distinguish between ideal and actual behaviour of the system. So, in the ought-to-be setting, we would use Oϕ to mean "ϕ is desirable" or "ideally ϕ is the case" rather than "ϕ is obliged". We would then have the possibility to specify what is to be done if the actual behaviour deviates from the ideal or desirable one. This enables us to specify adequately fault-tolerant behaviour of the software or system at hand. When Oϕ is read as "ideally ϕ" even the standard system SDL or Anderson's variant of this is useful: all paradoxes but Chisholm's lose their bite and become perfectly understandable and intuitive
properties of "ideality". So in this case we need not bother too much about deep problems (even changing the reading the O-operator slightly, as we please), and we may use SDL as a logic for ought-to-be constraints. The only thing that remains to be done is to provide a (pragmatic) solution of the Chisholm paradox, which we shall offer next.
A Solution to the 'Ought-to-Be' Version of the Chisholm Paradox: S5O (n)
In the previous section we have seen that a natural representation of the Chisholm set in SDL becomes inconsistent. The crux of the matter is that the inconsistency arises because of two norms Oq and O¬q that together are inconsistent because of the D-axiom in SDL and, a fortiori the fact that both norms are expressed by the same obligation operator O. We now propose to extend SDL with multiple O-operators to overcome this problem (without resorting to much more sophisticated things like dyadic deontic logic or conditional logic ([vW64] , Chapter 10 of [Che80])). To this end we introduce the logic S5O (n) which is has as modalities the universal necessity operator ¿ and a number of distinct operators O i which express obligation with respect to a frame of reference i.
The system S5O (n) consists of the following axioms and rules (here is used to abbreviate ¬¿¬):
and the rules (Taut), (MP) and
Note that the rule
(Kripke) Models for this system are of the form M = (S, π, R, {R i | i = 1, ..., n}), where S is the set of states, π is a truth assignment function, R = S × S is the (universal) possibility relation, and the R i are the deontic accessibility relations, which are assumed to be serial. Note that in this set-up it holds that R i ⊆ R.
The operator ¿ is now interpreted by means of the relation R, and the operators O i are interpreted by the relation R i . So, M, s ¥ ¿ϕ iff M, t ¥ ϕ for all t with R(s, t), and M, s ¥ O i ϕ iff M, t ¥ ϕ for all t with R i (s, t). The system S5O (n) can be shown sound and complete with respect to validity in this class of models via a standard argument.
Note that the following are non-validities in this logic:
The nonvalidity of the last formula expresses that it is now indeed possible to represent contrary norms in a consistent way, using distinct frames of reference, although within one frame of reference i the formula O i ϕ ∧ O i ¬ϕ is still inconsistent.
The Chisholm set can now be consistently (and nonredundantly) be represented as:
Moreover, note that in this representation the strange incongruence between (ii") and {iii") has disappeared. From this representation one can derive (iii") ¿(¬p → O 3 ¬q) ⇒ ¬p → O 3 ¬q ⇒ (iv") O 3 ¬q, and (ii")
gives a precise record of how the contrary norms come about (in frame 3, and in frame 2 via frame 1 on the other hand) without being inconsistent.
Ought-to-Do: The Dynamic Perspective
As said before, computer science provides a dynamic perspective. Basically this is because in this area one is interested in a way to compute (constructively) things, and since this process generally takes time, this naturally involves changes of computer states over time. We can distinguish at least the following three particular issues that are studied in computer science:
1. First and foremost computer science has to do with (computer) programs. Since its inception computer science has to do with algorithms to achieve certain goals and computer programs written in some computer language to enable one to execute these algorithms. These programs contain statements or instructions to express what has to be done. In other words programs express how certain actions involving (the hardware of) the computer should be performed. To reason about programs, special logics have been developed such as Hoare's logic and dynamic logic ( [Hoa69] , [Har79] ). (Also temporal logic has been employed for this purpose (see e.g.
[Krö87], [MP92] ). In some way one might view temporal logic as a dynamic logic in which one abstracts away from the particular actions that take place, and only considers the flow of time while executing a program. On the other hand, one might also view dynamic logic as a kind of temporal logic where records are kept of what exactly happens in a time step.) In these logics it is possible to express precisely what the effect is of the execution of (parts of) programs. One can use them to reason about pre-and postconditions of (executions of) programs. Since especially in dynamic logic this is done in a way that abstracts from the basic programming actions, it is an easy and straight-forward step to abstract away from the particular application to computer programs and consider general actions, whether they are supposed to be executed by computers or by humans. In this way, dynamic logic may be viewed as a general logic for reasoning about actions.
[DMW96]) have employed this idea in order to get a deontic logic for ought-to-do (i.e. obliged actions). We will sketch this approach below in section 5.1. Admittedly, also in the philosophical literature on deontic logic there have been proposals to distinguish between actions and assertions ([vW81] , [Cas81] , also cf. [Hil93] ), but we believe that the explicit connections with formalisms to reason about programs such as dynamic logic has made things much more concrete. Interestingly, recent proposals for a philosophical theory of action as put forward by Krister Segerberg (e.g. [Seg89] ), are also strongly influenced by the dynamic logic approach stemming from computer science and are very close in spirit to our approach.
2. More generally, computer science is concerned with the study of processes. Processes might be viewed as generalizations of executions of standard (sequential) programs, where also parallel (and nondeterministic) execution is catered for. In fact, there is a whole branch of theoretical computer science dealing with so-called process theory, which ranges from concurrency semantics in which models for concurrent or parallel (nondeterministic) programming are investigated (e.g. [Win82] , [BM88] , [vG90] ) to process algebra, in which one tries to give an algebraic calculus for this kind of programming ( [Mil80] , [BK86] , [BW90] ). In these algebraic calculi (or process algebras, as they are usually called) one is actually interested in calculating equivalences of processes on the basis of certain observational criteria: if two processes are indistinguishable with respect to some observational criterion, they are regarded as equal, so that one can reduce terms denoting complex processes to those representing simpler ones. This appears to be very useful when considering correctness issues of these processes: by algebraic calculation one aims at verifying certain properties of processes at hand such as protocols for communication between 'agents' (computers or processors within a multi-processor computer system).
We employed the dynamic perspective in the sense of using dynamic logic over process (algebraic) terms to treat the paradox of free choice permission. In [MW91] , [WM91] ,
[WM93a] we used an algebraic approach on process terms to distinguish between two choice operators representing free and imposed choice and obtained a framework (albeit complicated) in which both could be used intertwined. Here we mixed techniques from process algebra (and universal algebra) with dynamic logic to get a solution for this well-known problem in deontic logic. (In [DMW94a, DMW96] we gave a less involved solution to this problem using another (stronger) definition of permission together with admissible contexts for actions, but also here dynamic logic is a crucial ingredient of the approach.)
A Logic of Ought-to-Do: a Deontic Logic Based on Dynamic Logic
PDeL, introduced in [Mey88] , is a version of dynamic logic especially tuned to use as oughtto-do style deontic logic. It is based on the idea of Anderson's reduction of ought-to-be style deontic logic to alethic modal logic, but instead it reduces ought-to-do deontic logic to dynamic . In these papers we considered connectives for composing non-atomic actions, such as '∪' (choice, the dynamic analogue of disjunction in a static setting), '&' (parallel, the analogue of conjunction), ' -' (nonperformance, the analogue of negation), and ';' (sequential composition, which has no analogue in a static setting). Without giving a formal semantics here (see the papers mentioned above for that), the meaning of these are as follows: α 1 ∪ α 2 expresses a choice between α 1 and α 2 (this-roughly-corresponds to taking R α 1 ∪α 2 as the set-theoretic union of R α 1 and R α 2 ), α 1 the intersection of R α 1 and R α 2 ), α -(we will also often write −α) the non-performance of α, as stated above (it more or less amounts to taking R α to be some complement of R α , but see also the discussion below), and α 1 ; α 2 the performance of α 1 followed by that of α 2 . For a full account of the semantics of particularly negated actions we refer to [Mey88, DM90, DMW94a, DMW96].
The logic PDeL now consists of the following axioms and rules:
This results in the following theorems concerning the deontic operators:
The Paradoxes in PDeL
A nice feature of PDeL is that most of the paradoxes appearing in SDL are either not expressible or, if they are, not valid (cf. [Mey88] , [MW93a] ). To be more specific, if we consider (dynamic variants of) the paradoxes 1 − 10 of section 2, we get: To give an informal example, "murdering someone gently" involves "murdering someone".
(Cf. the discussion of Forrester's paradox in the next subsection.) We refer to PDeL extended with the operator » as PDeL(»).
Now we can express dynamic counterparts of 5':
Whether this is a validity in PDeL(») depends on the interpretation of the negated action α -. As we have discussed in e.g. [WM93] there is not an obvious unique choice for this. A possible choice-which, by the way, we purposely did not follow in our original paper [Mey88] -would be that the accessibility relation R α associated with α -is the set-theoretical complement of that (R α ) associated with α, i.e., R α = (S × S) \ R α , where S is the set of all possible worlds. In this case we have that α » β implies β -»
. In its turn this implies that under this interpretation of negated action we have that 5' is a validity (since So to deal with this we should really construct a hybrid logic of both ought-to-do and ought-tobe operators. In Section 7 we shall discuss a proposal into this direction, which nevertheless will not have the above formulas as validities.
A Solution to the 'Ought-to-Do' Version of the Chisholm Paradox in PDeL
Here we like to show how the dynamic perspective and particularly PDeL can help us solve the problems with the Chisholm set. To analyse the problem in PDeL we need to be a little more other words: it obligatory to perform the sequence α followed by β, and moreover, if α has not been done, one is in a state of violation but nevertheless also forbidden to do β (see [Mey88] ).
This is exactly as one would expect.
The "parallel" version of the Chisholm set (2i)
it is obligatory to do α In SDL this is a big problem again. There one would use a formalization like (using m for committing murder and g for committing a murder gently):
together with the implicit necessary truth (F4') g → m Now we can derive: (F4':) g → m ƒ SDL O(g → m) ƒ SDL Og → Om, so that by (F3') and (F2') we arrive at Om, which, apart from being quite absurd, is inconsistent (in SDL) with (F1')! Castañeda dubbed Forrester's paradox as the "deepest" in deontic logic ( [Cas84] ): the main reason being that distinguishing between assertions and actions ("practitions") did not help in his approach to deal with it. He placed emphasis on the fact that there is an adverb ("aspect"), viz. gently, involved. However, we believe that the problem is the simultaneity of actions: one should be gentle (or rather act gently) while murdering (see also [Mey87] ). if we would consider a "forward" variant of Forrester's set, we get something which is very easy to formulate in PDeL:
e.g. In PDeL, using obvious abbreviations:
In fact, this is "one half" of the forward Chisholm set (viz. isomorphic to the set {(1i'), (1iii')}, since Fg is equivalent with Og -, so that taking α = g -results in the aforementioned set). Now, however, we have a parallel version, for which the above representation is erroneous. As we stated in [Mey87] , in some sense the Forrester paradox (but also the parallel version of the Chisholm paradox) is the hardest to represent in PDeL. As was shown there the intuitive representation (F1") Fm it is forbidden to murder
one ought to not-murder or murder gently is not adequate either, since in PDeL the latter (which is equivalent with F(m & g -)) is derivable from the first, which contradicts the intuition. But, as we indicated in [Mey87] too, there is an easy way out by using multiple violation atoms (as we have also been using frequently in subsequent papers). In short, assuming that we have a set {V i } i of distinct violation atoms and using the abbreviations F k α ↔ def [α]V k and O k α ↔ def ¬F k α we can now adequately represent
Forrester's set as
which has as a desirable consequence [m & g -](V 1 ∧ V 2 ), i.e., after murdering someone nongently one is guilty of two offences: having murdered someone and having been not gentle while murdering. Note that 'just' murdering someone gets one into a state where V 1 holds, while murdering someone in a non-gentle way yields a state where V 1 ∧ V 2 . One might thus view the latter state as even less ideal than the former. In [DMW94b] we have elaborated on the notion of (sub-)ideality. In that paper we went even a step further in analyzing the effect of actions on violations by not only considering whether by performing an action a state results in a violation state, but also whether the transition brought about by the action changes the state of violation.
We will not pursue this here.
Finally, in PDeL with multiple violations the parallel version of the Chisholm set can be represented in a similar way as the Forrester one:
it is forbidden to do both α and non-β at the same time
it is forbidden to do both β and non-α at the same time 3. The "backward" version of the Chisholm set. This is the original one, as formulated by Chisholm:
(3i) it is obligatory to do α (3ii) if you do α, you have to do β first (i.e., before α) (3iii) if you don't do α, you have to do non-β (first) (3iv) you don't do α This is perhaps the more difficult one to express in PDeL, since PDeL does not contain an operator of the kind "if you do α, you have to do β first ". Surely again, if one would use the same representation as for the forward version, one does not get the intended result, e.g. (2ii) would be misrepresented. In [Mey87] it is argued that the best representation in PDeL is:
it is forbidden to do non-β followed by α (3iii') F 3 (β ; α -) it is forbidden to do β followed by non-α See [Mey87] for a more elaborate discussion on this representation. We admit that it would be far nicer to have a representation closer to the natural language representation, but this would call for a non-trivial extension of PDeL, in which one also can reason "backward" directly.
We have seen how we can reason about ought-to-be and ought-to-do constraints in separate logics. However, in the practice of system specification one naturally needs both notions intermingled, so that an integrated logic for both these notions is called for.
An Integrated Logic of Ought-to-Be and Ought-to-Do Constraints
In [AMW93] we have proposed a unifying framework for reasoning about ought-to-be and ought-to-do constraints. There we employed PDeL as in Section 6 for ought-to-do constraints and Anderson's reduction ([And58]) for ought-to-be constraints. Since in this paper we started out from SDL with normal deontic modalities (which are not defined by a reduction to alethic modal logic as in Anderson's reduction) we have to do a little more work to integrate our logics for ought-to-do and ought-to-be.
Anderson's Reduction to Modal Alethic Logic Related to SDL
As mentioned before, Anderson [And58] reduced deontic modalities to alethic ones by employing the special propositional atom V denoting 'something bad' or undesirable, which we refer to as 'violation'. In a logic with an S5-type (alethic) necessity operator ¿ we can define the obligation operator O' by O' ϕ = ¿(¬ϕ → V), expressing that something is obligated iff it is necessarily the case that the falsity of ϕ implies being in a state of violation. (Actually, Anderson used the modal system KT as a basis, but we will use S5 instead.) Semantically, we employ (simple) S5-models for the modality ¿: such a model consists of a non-empty set S of worlds and a universal accessibility relation on S; in a world the formula ¿ϕ holds iff ϕ holds in all worlds of S.
We now show that this idea is related to the standard definition of obligation in SDL (cf. also Part IV of [Åqv84] ). Recall that SDL-models are Kripke models M = (S, π, R), where S is a non-empty set of possible worlds, π is a truth assignment function of the propositional atoms per world, and R is an accessibility relation pointing at deontically ideal alternatives: R(s, t) represents that the world t is a deontically ideal alternative for s. In a world s ∈ S, the formula Oϕ is said to hold iff ϕ holds in all deontically ideal alternatives of s: (M, s) ¥ Oϕ iff (M, t) ¥ ϕ for all t with R(s, t).
We can reconcile Anderson's approach with SDL if we consider the worlds where V does not hold as ideal worlds, independent of the world where we are viewing from.
That is to say, if we take this definition of the relation R, the SDL-based obligation operator coincides with Anderson's operator.
Note that form this definition of R it follows immediately that the relation R is an equivalence relation, so that the operator O (= O') satisfies the well-known S5-axioms as well: In fact, when we add (P) and (F) to express permission and prohibition in terms of obligation again, we obtain an extension of S5O (1) from Section 5 (where we drop the subscript 1 from the operators): besides the axioms and rules of that system
we have additionally:
The axiom (opt!) expresses that there is actually only one (a unique) set of ideal or optimal states, independent from the world one is looking from.
This system can be shown sound and complete with respect to the class of Kripke models we have defined above. (It is in fact a special case of the system S5P in [MH95] and can also be viewed as a subsystem of the system of Kraus & Lehmann for knowledge and belief for one agent [KL86] .) It can be shown that all the other validities we have listed above are derivable in the system. (The system, however, still contains some redundancy: one can omit (4 O ) and (5 O ) from the system without loss of inferential power. E.g. (4 O ) is derivable from (opt!) and (⊇).
We have nevertheless included (4 O ) and (5 O ) to expose the link with Deontic S5 explicitly.)
Whether the system S5O (1) is suitable for normative reasoning is again a matter of pragmatics.
Of course, (4 O ) and (5 O ) are highly implausible if one wants to interpret nested obligation in a meaningful way. (This has been the traditional objection against Deontic S5, cf. [Che80] .) On the otehr hand, if one is simply not interested in these nested obligations this logic provides a way of eliminating them in any expression, and the system becomes very useful indeed.
Integrating S5O (n) with PDeL
The view unifying Anderson's reduction with SDL as expounded above provides us with the opportunity to give a natural integration of our ought-to-be and ought-to-do frameworks. For the ought-to-do approach we employ multiple violation atoms V i (in order to represent contraryto-duty constraints adequately). We now simply employ a multiple V i -version of the logic above for the ought-to-be part, which then amounts to using the system S5O (n) together with the axioms:
The discussion of relating Anderson's reduction to SDL generalizes easily to the case of S5O (n) where multiple violation atoms and modalities are employed by defining R i (s, t) ⇔ (M, t) ¡ V i . Now we can add the ought-to-do part of Section 6 without any difficulty:
We finally mention that in this integrated logic the formulas as mentioned at the end of Section 6.2, i.e.
which may be viewed as a desirable feature of this approach.
Applications
Library regulations are a popular source of examples for deontic logicians. We have specified the rules for borrowing and returning documents from a library in an earlier paper [WMW89] .
Jones [Jon90] points out that the Chisholm set appears in library regulations as follows. If p identifies a person and d a document, then the following rules are quite common:
• p shall return d by date due.
• If p does not return d by data due, then disciplinary action shall be taken against p.
• If p returns d by date due, then disciplinary action is not taken against p.
Other applications of deontic logic involve bank accounts. For example, we have shown that in a combined logic of ought-to-be and ought-to-do such as the one in the previous section, it can be proven that having a negative balance of a bank account (a forbidden state) implies the obligation to deposit money (an obligated action) [AMW93, AMW96] . The popularity of examples like these may be taken as evidence of the fact that deontic logicians have ample experience with libraries and negative bank accounts. Although the examples are quite realistic (especially the negative bank account), we here take another interesting case study, the specification of procedures for overseas trade. We use an analysis of this case by Bons, Lee and Wagenaar [BLW94] as point of departure. It turns out that the overseas trade procedures illustrate all three variants of the Chisholm set that we identified above. In order to understand the example, we must digress a little in overseas trade procedures. During this explanation, it will become clear that deontics play an essential role in the specification of this procedure.
The problem with overseas trade is that the seller does not want to ship his goods before he is paid but the buyer does not want to pay before he receives the goods. To get out of this deadlock, buyer and seller each contact a bank in their own country, called the issuing bank and corresponding bank, respectively.
The buyer and seller negotiate a contract in which the buyer promises to buy goods from the seller at a certain price and the seller promises to sell these goods at this price to the buyer. The buyer then enters a contract with the issuing bank, which results in a letter of credit (LoC) in which the buyer specifies which documents the seller must produce in evidence of his performance according to contract. The LoC may be subject to further negotiations between the buyer and seller. Once the LoC is produced, the seller is obliged to produce the documents specified in the LoC, evidencing his performance according to the sales contract. In this situation we have a number of (ought-to-be) constraints that must be satisfied in order for the procedure to work. We will show that these constraints entail ought-to-do constraints specifying constraints on the actions executed in the procedure. For example, there is an (oughtto-be) constraint which asserts that it ought to be the case that if the carrier C has the goods then the seller S has the BoL:
Here and in the sequel the letters C and S are used as identifiers of the carrier and seller, respectively. A transfer from C to S will be denoted C2S and the reverse transfer is denoted S2C, with the transferred item as parameter. Similar notations will also be used involving the corresponding bank CB.
From the above ought-to-be constraint we can derive a related ought-to-do constraint, if we assume some further obvious things like the fact that the seller's transferring the goods to the carrier results in the carrier having the goods, i.e., [S2C(Goods)]Has_Goods(C) and the fact that if the carrier has no goods then after not transferring the goods by the seller to the carrier the carrier still has no goods, viz.
¬Has_BoL(S) → [−C2S(BoL)]¬Has_BoL(S).
For we can now derive an ought-to-do constraint in our logic expressing that in a state where the seller has no BoL it is forbidden that the seller transfers the goods to the carrier while the carrier does not send the BoL to the seller: ¬Has_BoL(S) → Together with an obligation that in some situation the seller should supply the goods to the carrier O 3 (S2C(Goods)) (3)-as required in a contract, the constraints (1), (2) and (3) constitute an instantiation of the parallel version of the Chisholm set, which proves again the importance of this set in practice.
In fact, we can also easily derive instantiations of the other versions. For instance, from the ought-to-be constraint that it should be so that if the seller S has got the money then the corresponding bank CB has the BoL: Money) ), so that with a ought-to-be constraint O 7 (S2CB(BoL)) (effective after S's transferring goods to C, for example) we obtain an instance of the forward Chisholm set.
In passing we observe that it holds that from [S2CB(BoL)](Has_BoL(CB) ∧ ¬Has_Money(S)), we obtain [S2CB(BoL)]V 5 and thus F 5 S2CB(BoL), which means that even if it is obliged for the seller to send the BoL to the corresponding bank on the grounds of the obligation O 7 (S2CB(BoL)), it is nevertheless forbidden to stop just here without completing the transaction (and do CB2S(Money))! Thus this provides an interesting example where we have on the one hand an obligation to do an action α in order to execute a transaction α ; β, while on the other hand doing (just) α is forbidden. In our framework we can express this consistently by means of our multiple violation atoms without any difficulty. Note, by the way, that in this example the assumption that S2CB(BoL) » −CB2S(Money) is crucial! If it is allowed that S2CB(BoL) may also involve a concurrent transfer of money from CB to S doing just is (and should) not be forbidden, of course.
Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper we have seen how deontic logic may be employed for specifying normative integrity constraints for information systems. A key claim of our paper is that ought-to-be and ought-to-do constraints follow different logics, but also that these logics can be integrated enabling representing and reasoning about both types of constraints in one single framework. A side issue, but nevertheless an important one as to the topic of this paper, is that in order to deal with problematic cases of representation, known from the philosophical literature, one may adhere to a pragmatic view and use logics that are adequate for concrete situations though not necessarily so in general: to specify concrete constraints for practical systems one need not solve all profound problems that philosophy poses for the general abstract case!
